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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FLORENCE SCHWEITZER,
Platnt~ff and Re-spondent,
-vs.HARVEY STONE, S & I TRUCKING COMPANY, LLOYD V. I-IIGGENBOTHAM, and WE~S~TER,N
.L~\UTO TRANSPORT COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants,
and
FRED SULLIVAN,
Defendant, Cfoss-Complatnant and
Respondent,
-vs.I\TAN SHEFFY,
Plaintiff tn I ntervent~on and
Respondent.

C.ase No. 921

BRIEF OF LLOYD V. HIGGENBOTHAM AND
WESTERN AUTO TRANSPORT COMPANY,
APPELLANTS
THE NATURE OF THE CASE
On April 20, 1957, at about 10:30 P.M., on Highway
30, approximately 14 miles west of Castle Rock in Summit County, Utah, Harvey Stone, an employee of the
S & I Trucking Company was driving said company's
truck east\vard "\vithin the scop·e of his employment when
1
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it ran out of fuel and stalled on an up-grade partially
blocking the eastbound traffic lanes. In attempting to
start the engine Harvey Stone was assisted by Ivan
Sheffy, also an employee of S & I Trucking Company
who had parked his truck further eastwaDd and walked
back to help Stone. While so parked, an eastbound
Western Auto Transport truck driven by Lloyd V.
Higgenbotham, an employee of said company, and while
in the scop·e of his employment collided with the rear of
the trailer of the S & I truck injuring the drivers of both
veh~cles, I van Sheffy and Fred Sullivan who was riding
in the sleeper compartment of the cab of the Western
Auto Transport truck. Fred Sullivan o'vned the tractor,
which was under lease to Western Auto Transport. His
capacity .at the time of the accident was that of an
employee of Western Auto Transport.
T.he force of the collision caused one of the vehicles,
a pick-up truck carried by the W este·rn Auto Transport
vehicle, to break loose from the load and fall to the highway where it blocked the westbound traffic lane. Shortly
after the collison between the two trucks .a passenger
vehicle driven in a westerly direction by John S-chweitzer,
while attempting to avoid colliding with the dislodged
pick-up tn1ck collided with the rear left portion of the
S & I trailer at the lef·t front of the \\restern Auto Transport tractor. Florence Schweitzer, a passenger in her
husband's car, filed suit for personal injury damage
against I-Iarvey Stone, S & I Trucking Company, Lloyd
Higgenbothan1, ~-,red Sullivan and \"Vestern Auto Transport Company. J_Jloyd I-Iiggenbotha1n, \\T estern Auto
2
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Transport .and Fred Sullivan cross-complained against
Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking Company, who counter-cross-claimed. I van Sheffy filed a Complaint in inter·
vention against Lloyd Higgenbotham, vVestern Auto
Transport and Fred Sullivan.
On the trial of the case Western Auto Transport,
Lloyd Higgenbotham and Fred Sullivan settled the
Florence Schwei~tzer claim before the case was submitted
to the jury, \vhich returned a verdict of $23,000.00 agains:t
all defendants \vith the ex·ception of Fred Sullivan, who
\Vas disn1issed out ·of the case .as a party defendant as a
matter of la,v. The further sum of $4,500.00 \Vas returned
in favor of I van Sheffy on his ·Complaint in intervention
again Lloyd Higgenbotham and Western Auto Transp·ort,
and the sum of $8,000.00 in favor of Fred Sulliv.an on
his Cross-Complaint against Harvey Stone and the S & I
Trucking Company.
This is an appeal by Lloyd Higgenbotham and
\Vestern Auto Transp-ort fro1n the judgment in favor of
I v.an Sheffy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The collision between the s·talled S & I Truck and
the vVestern Auto Transport truck occurred at about
10:30 p.1n., April 20, 1957,_ on an uphill grade about 14
miles \vest of Castle Rock in Summit County, Utah, on
U. S. Highway 30. The high\vay at that point runs generally e.ast and \Vest and is straight for ap·proximately
eight-tenths of a mile west of the scene of the accident.
The night 'Yas dark; it had rained earlier but at the
3
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time of the accident the surface of the highway was dry.
Beginning approximately 600 feet to the west .at the start
of the grade, the highway was divided into two eastbound
traffic lanes approximately 12 feet in width and one
westerly traffic lane 19 feet in width. On the south side
there was a distance of 2.3 feet between the eastbound
outside lane and the edge of the hard surface. The
shoulder on the south side was sloped downward while
the edge of the hard surfa;ce on the north side was protected by guard rails. (Exhibit H 13).
Before the accident a tr.actor pulling a flatbed type
trailer loaded with sacks of ''drill mud'' owned by the
S & I Trucking ·Company, and driven by its employee
Harvey Stone, 'vas piroceeding easterly up-grade when
the engine began to sputter and stopped. Mr. Stone was
of the opinion that the main fuel tank was empty and
attempted to switch connections to the auxiliary fuel tank
without success, and the truck stopped in a diagonal
position with the righit front wheels slightly off the hard
surface and the rear of the loaded trailer extending
about three feet over the dividing line into the inside
eastbound lane. (T. 138, 139, Exhibit 13). Mr. Stone
remained in the cab attempting to start the engine by
operating the starter.
I van Sheffy, also an S & I employee, testified he
was driving a truck 1,000 to 1,500 feet to the rear of the
Stone vehicle when he s.aw it begin to turn from the inside to the outside lane. (T. 292). When he passed Mr.
Stone's truck it \vas still moving. Mr. Sheffy parked his
truck about 400 to 500 feet further east, (T. 295) and
4
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walked back to ~Ir. Stone's ·truck where he stood on the
left side of the highway surface with his head in the cab
assisting Stone start the engine. Sheffy did not see the
lights of the approaching Western Auto Transport truck.
l-Ie es~timated he could see one-half mile of the highway
to the vvest ( T. 309), and he did not hear the sound of the
approaching vVestern Auto Transport truck coming upgrade. ( T. 315). I-Ie testified there was noise from the
operation of the starter of the Stone truck (T. 318) which
vvas oper.ated intermittently and not continuously. (T.
354). As he vvas thus assisting Mr. Stone, 1fr. Sheffy
vvas aware of the fact that the truck was not protected
by flares (T. 310), and that the highway vvas heavily
traveled. (T. 307).
Lloyd Higgenbotha1n, an employee of Western Auto
Transport vvas driving a truck loaded with automobiles
and pick-up trucks, easterly. The tractor was leased to
\\res tern Auto Transport by Fred Sullivan, also ,an
e1nployee of that company and who was sleeping in the
cab co1npartment ~7hen the accident hap·pened.
As Lloyd Higgenbothan1 traveled e·asterly, he met
t\vo \Ves~tbound trueks about t-vvo or three miles west of
the s-cene of the collision. He switched his lights from
high be.a1n to lovv beam and the svvitch remained in the
lo\v bea1n position until the collision \vith the S & I truck
occurred. As he approached the scene his truck was in
the outside lane of traffic travelling 48 nliles per hour.
( T. 97) There \vere no lights on the stalled vehicle ( T.
99), and he did not becon1e a -vvare of its location on the
high,vay until he \vas approximately 70 feet R\vay. On
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first observation he couldn't determine what it was because the load blended into the color pattern of the highway. (T. 93). Mr. Higgenbotham attempted to turn the
Western Auto Transport truck to the left but was unable
to avoid colliding with the rear of the S & I load. (T.
100). Before he and Sullivan could get flares out, the
seeonrd collision involving Mr. Schweitzer occurred.
On the third day of trial Western Auto Transport,
Lloyd Higgenbotham and Fred Sullivan settled the claim
of Florence Schweitzer against 'them. At the conclusion
of the evidence, the remaining issues between the parties
were submitted to the jury on a "special verdict." The
jury found unanimously that Harvey Stone was negligent
in failing to have lights on or flares about the S & I truck
immediately before the collision and that such negligence
was a proximate cause of the collision. ( T. 92). The jury
found unanimously that Ivan Sheffy was negligent in
exposing himself to the hazard in assisting Harvey Stone
to start the stalled trnek when it was unlighted and not
protected by flares, and also that Sheffy was negligent in
failing to keep a prop·er lookout for his own safety, but
that neither finding of negligence was a proximate eause
of his injuries. (T. 95).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT
A VERDICT OF "NO CAUSE OF ACTION'' IN FAVOR OF
·THESE APPELLANTS AND AGAINST INTERVENOR IVAN
SHEFFY, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE GRANTING A NEW
TRIAL, BECAUSE THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL
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VERDICT, AND THE COURT WAS REQUIRED TO FIND AS
A MATTER OF LAW THAT INTERVENOR SHEFFY'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY
AND DAMAGE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FAILING 'TO RECEIVE IN EVIDENCE CERTAIN PROFFERED WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RECORDS OF THE
STATE OF WYOMING.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT
A VERDICT OF "NO CAUSE OF ACTION" IN FAVOR OF
THESE APPELLANTS AND AGAINST INTERVENOR IV AN
SHEFFY, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE GRANTING A NEW
TRIAL, BECAUSE THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL
VERDICT, AND THE COURT WAS REQUIRED TO FIND AS
A MATTER OF LAW THAT INTERVENOR SHEFFY'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY
AND DAMAGE.

At the conclusion of the evidenee the eourt instructed
the jury generally on the issues raised in the case. Also,
pursuant to Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
court subn1itted to the jury a series of interrogatories in
\Vhich it \v.as directed to 1nake specific findings. The
pertinent portion of those questions submitted and the
ans\vers made by the jury are as follo\vs:
"QUESTION I
(A) Was Harvey Stone negligent by allowing the
gasoline of one tank to become exhausted
before svvitching to the auxiliary gasoline
tank~

Answer: Yes
7
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If so, was such negligence a p·roxirnate cause
of the collision,
(a) Between the two trucks involved f
Answer: Yes
(b) Between the Sehweitzer car and
two trucks involved f
Answer: Yes
(B) Was Harvey ·Stone negligent in failing to
remove the S & I truck from th·e travelled
portion of the highway~
Answer: No
If so, was such negligenee a proximate cause
of the collision,
(a) Between the two trucks involved f
Answer: No
(b) Between the Schweitzer car and
the two trucks involved f
Answer: No
(C) Was Harvey Stone negligent in failing to
have lights on or flares about the S & I
truck immediately prior to the collision between the two trucks 1
Answer: Yes
If so, was such negligence a proximate cause
of the collision,
(a) Between the two trucks involved f
Answer: Yes
(b) Between 'the Schweitzer car and
the two trucks involved~
Answer: Yes''
8
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"QUESTION III
(A) Did Ivan Sheffy negligently expose himself
to a hazard which he knew or in the exercise
of a reasonable eare should have known
might result in harm to him by assisting
H.arvey Stone to start the stop·ped truck
when there were no lights on sai~d truck with.
out first putting flares out to warn other
motorists of the presence of said truck~
Answer: Yes
If so, was such negligence a proxima:te cause
of the injuries which Ivan Sheffy received~
Answer: No
(B) Did Ivan Sheffy fail to keep such a lookout
for his own safety while he was assisting
H.arvey Stone as would have been kept by a
reasonably pTudent person under the same
circumstances~

Answer: Yes
If so, was such failure a proximate cause of
the injuries to Ivan Sheffy~
(R. 90)
Answer: No''
.A..fter ansvvering the questions indicated, the jury
returned a general verdict of $4,500.00 as damages sustained by Ivan Sheffy, (R. 97) and against Lloyd V.
Higgenbotham and Western Auto Transport Con1pany.
(R. 106). These appellants took proper and timely exception to the court's ruling .a.n,d filed a n1otion for a
directed verdict and motion for a new trial. (R. 190 to
201).
Rule 49 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
''. . . vVhen the general v·erdict and the ans9
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wers are harmonious, the court shall direct the
entry of the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers. When the answers are consistent with each other, hut one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may
dire'Ct the entry of judgment in accordance with
the answers, nO'twithstanding the general verdict
or may return the jury for further consideration
of its answers and verdict or may order a ne"\\T
trial. When the answers are inconsistent with
each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not
direet the entry ·of judgment but may return the
jury for further consideration of its answers and
verdict or may order a new trial.''
As noted above, Mr. Harvey Stone was found negligent in two particulars, both of which were found by the
jury to be the proximate cause of the collision between
the two trucks and the Schweitzer automobile. He was
found negligent in allowing ''the gasoline of one tank to
beeome exhausted before switching to the auxiliary gasoline tank,'' and ''in failing to have lights on or flares
about the S & I truck immediately prior to the collision
between the two trucks.'' Mr. I van Sheffy was found
negligent in exposing' 'himself to a hazard which he
knew, or in the exercis.e of reasonable care should have
known, might re·sult in harm to him by assisting Harvey
Stone to start the stop·p-ed truck '""hen there were no
lights on sa~d truck without f~rst putttng flares out to
wa.rn other motorists of the presence of sai.d truck," and
also of failing "to keep such lookout for his own safety
while he was assitsing Harvey Stone as ''""ould have been
kept by a reasonably prudent person under the same
10
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circumstances.'' The jury found that neither of these
findings of negligence as pertained to Mr. Sheffy were
the proximate cause of his injuries. These findings are
inconsistent.
Mr. Sheffy's conduct at the time he returned to assist Mr. Ston·e is stated as follows: (R. 264)

"Q.

Now, what did you do after you back to
the truck, Mr. Stone's truck~

A.

After I rea'Ched Mr. Stone's truck, he opened
the door and I asked him wha:t was wrong,
and-

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And he was trying to start his truck.
His engine was dead, was it~
His engine was dead. That's right.
And what was he doing in trying to start it~
He had-what was he doing~
Yes.
Well, he w.as turning it ·over.
With ·the starter~
vVith the starter. That's right, sir.
What did you do~
And I asked him if he was out of gas. And
he said: 'I don't know, it just stopped.'
And I figured he must be ; and when he said
that, I turned-they have a lit·tle valve right
on the left of the driver, and if you do run
out of g.as, you can switch to another tank
by turnng the valve, and so I did that, and
I told him: 'Do you have the electric fuel
pump on~' . A.nd he said: 'Yes', and at that
same tin1e he vvas trying to start it.''

* * *

11
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Mr. Sheffy observed that he could see one-half n1ile
to the rear of the Stone vehicle. ( T. 266). While assisting Mr. Stone, he ''leaned in the reab on the left side while
his feet remained on the ground." (T. 266). He stated
further" ... I was looking inside helping Mr. Stone trying to get his vehicle started." ( T. 266, 267). While thus
assisting Mr. Stone, he saw no lights or heard no noise
from an approaching truck or other automobiles. The·
force of ·the impact with the Western Auto Transport
tru·ck "knocked (Mr. Sheffy) behind the duel wheels of
the tractor''. He didn't observe the direction or source
of the eollision.
Mr. Sheffy and Mr. Stone were engaged in doing
the same act~at the same place-at the same time. Since
the jury determined that the act of attempting to start
the truck in the dark of night without the benefit of clearance lights or flares to protect themselves or approaching
traffic constituted negligence, which was the proximate
cause of the resulting collisions, it is impossible to reconcile this finding with their finding that the same negligenee "\Vas not a proximate cause of ~fr. Sheffy's injury.
In .addition, 1\{r. Sheffy was found to have been negligent
in failing to mantain a proper lookout for his own safety
under the circumstances. This finding seems obvious
since he testified that he could see one-half mile to the
rear of the Stone vehicle, but yet failed to see the approaching lights of the Western Auto Transport truck.
It was .a cool .dark night in April and even though the
approaching Western Auto Transport truck \vas pulling
a heavy load up-grade, Mr. Sheffy failed to hear it as it
12
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approached. rrhe negligence in e.ach partieular was continuing in nature.
There is no reasonable basis for distinguishing between the acts of Mr. Stone and Mr. Sh·effy. Each had
been found negligent on an additional ground; Mr. Stone
in permitting his truck to run out of gas, .and Mr. Sheffy
in failing to maintain a reasonable p·rudent lookout for
his own safety. Such is of no comfort or assistanee to
l\Ir. Sheffy, however, beeause both Mr. Stone and Mr.
Sheffy \Vere found guilty of a common act of negligence
\vhich under the circumstances of this case cannot be the
proximate cause as to one and not the proximate cause
as to the other. As a matter of fact, Mr. Sheffy 's established negligence of failing to maintain .a reasonable
lookout for his own safety was continuing and concurrent
'vith his negligent act of attempting to start the truck
under the eircumstances indicated.
There is no evidence of an independent intervening
cause which is sufficient to insulate Mr. Sheffy's established negligence as a pToximate cause. Farrell vs. Cameron, 98 Ut. 68, 94 P. 2d 1068, (1939). The chain of events
\vhich \Vere set in motion by the eombined and concurrent negligence of Mr. Sheffy and Mr. Stone were continuing and under the facts of this case, eausation cannot
legally be separated between them.
Since the jury had determined ~fr .S heffy's negligence, the court should have found proximate cause
under the circumstances as a matter of law because the
'' ... evidentiary facts are of such conclusive character
1

13
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as to require
ultimate fact
result of his
249 p. 2d 213,

all reasonable minds to eonclude that the
... of proximate cause ... '' existed as a
conduct. Gibbs v. Blue CabJ 122 Ut. 312
215 (1952).

This ease is similar to the case of Remy v. Exley
Produce Express, 307 P. 2d 65, (Calif. 1957). Plaintiff
Remy brought an action to recover for damages arising
out of a collision between his truck with defendant's approaching truck which had crossed the center line at
approximately the same location where co-defendant B
and B Auto Sales automobile had been left stuck in a
snow bank on the defendant's side of the highway. Defendant Exley Produce Express filed a cross complaint
against the plaintiff, Remy and co-defendant B and B
Auto Sales. In the main action the plaintiff was given
judgment against both defendants Exley Produce Exp.ress and B and B Auto Sales. On the cross complaint
Exley was given judgn1ent against B and B Auto Sales.
The court observed at page 67:
'''This, then, brings us to the question of
whether the verdicts and judgment were inconsistent, one with the other. Plaintiff's. verdict and
judgn1ent were against both the parked ears (B &
B Auto Sales) and the Exley truck. Thus, there
was an implied finding that both ·w. ere negligent,
but the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the
Exley truck and against a parked car (B & B
Auto Sales) thereby in1pliedly finding that while
the Exley truck, "\vhose dan1age was due to its
collision with plaintiff's truck, was negligent as
against plaintiff's truck, it was not negligent as
against the parked cars. Put another way, the
jury in1pliedly found that 'vhen the Exley truck
14
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collided with plaintiff's truck the cause, so far
as the injury to plaintiff's truck was concerned,
'v,as the joint negligence of the parked cars end
the Exley truck, and yet the damage to the Exley
truck in that same collision, was solely caused by
the negligence of the parked cars.

* * *
'' ... It is clear that the two verdicts and judgment, finding as they impliedly do, that Exley in
one act w.as 'negligent and not negligent' are inconsistent, and that the judgment appealed fron1
cannot stand.''
vVhile the cited case deals in terms of negligence it
is submitted that under the circumstances of the p·resent
case, the established negligent conduct of Mr. Sheffy and
l\Ir. Stone cannot .at the same time be the proximate cause
as to one but not of the other.
Again in the case of Detrixhe v. :JfcQuvgg, 316 P. 2d
617, (Okla. 1957), a proble1n ·of inconsistent verdicts was
considered. In that case Dick C. Detrixhe was operating
a pick-up truck belonging to Edward P. Detrixhe & Sons,
a partnership, of which he 'v,as a member, in an easterly
direction along a county road. George L. Dietrixhe, who
\\~as not a 1nember -of the partnership, was a passenger
in the pick-up. As the vehicle approached the summit of
a small hill, .an automobile owrned and driven by Joseph
~fcQuigg can1e over the hill proceeding westward. rrhe
two vehicles collided in the center of the road. All the
named individuals 'vere injured and the vehicles damaged.. There were three actions initiated :
1. By Dick C. Detrixhe, against McQuigg, to recover for his personal injuries. In this e.ase ~[cQuigg
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cross petitioned against Detrixhe for his personal injuries and damage to his car.
2.

By George Detrixhe against McQuigg; and

3. Edward P. Detrixhe & Sons, a partnership,
against McQuigg.
By stipulation the three cases were consolidated and
tried by the same jury, although separate instructions
were given in each action.
In the first action, Dick C. Detrixhe was granted a
recovery. On defendant's eross claim the jury found for
defendant McQuigg.
In the second action, the jury found against MeQuigg
and in favor of George Detrixhe, and
In the third case, the jury found against
.and in favor of Detrixhe & Sons, a partnership.

~fcQuigg

The court accepted the last t\vo verdicts and resubmitted the first after further instructions, "~hereupon
the jury returned the follovving verdict:
We, the jury*** find for the defendant Joseph H. McQuigg on his cross petition, and against
plaintiff Dick C. Detrixhe ... ''
It is immediately observed that the jury found
McQuigg negligent in two actions and not negligent in
another, and likewise found Dick Detrixhe free from
contributory negligence in t\vo .actions, but negligent in
his own. The court found that the verdicts were inconsistent and granted a new trial.
See also the ease of Stat.z v. Pohl, 63 NW 2d 556,
(Wise.), where a jury in an auton1obile collision case
found the driver negligent as to control, but determined
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that such negligence was not a proximate cause of the
accident. In an answer to a question inquiring as to
comparative negligence, the jury found that the driver's
negligence eontributed to cause the accident to the extent
of 20 percent. rrhe verdict was inconsistent and a nevv
trial was granted.
Where proximate cause is clear it becomes the duty
of the trial court to direct a verdict. Here the question
was considerably simplified inasmuch as the negligence
of Mr. Sheffy was established as was the negligence of
Mr. Stone. It is submitte·d that under the facts of this
case, the continuing established negligence of Mr. She.ffy
superimposed upon his further negligence of failing to
1naintain a reasonable lookout for his own safety, was a
proxi1nate ·cause of his injury which was sufficient to
bar his re·covery of any damages for injuries received.
The trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in
favor of these appellants and against Mr. Sheffy on the
issue of proximate cause, and in failing to grant a new
trial because the jury's answers to interrogatories were
inconsistent 'Yith the general verdict.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FAILING 'TO· RECEIVE IN EVIDENCE CER.TAIN PROFFERED WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RECORDS OF THE
STATE OF WYOMING.

During the course of the trial, the attorney for
\V.estern Auto Transp·ort .and its drivers Lloyd Higgenbotham and Fred Sullivan, tendered in evidence a medical report prepared by Dr. Knap·p, which had been prepared for and filed with the Department of Workmen's
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Compensation of the State of Wyoming. (Ex. H 30).
The report revealed the results of .a medical examination
made by Dr. Robert D. Knap·p concerning the physical
condition of Mr. Ivan Sheffy between April 26th and
August 10, 1957. The reports indicate.d that Mr. Sheffy's
injuries were of a temporary nature and that he did not
sustain permanent disability as a result of the accident.
Further, a report of Dr. Robert K. Knapp bearing date
December 7, 1958, was read in evidence in which he stated
that Mr. Sheffy had suffered a permanent physical disability as a result of the accident. (T. 287). Also, Mr.
Sheffy testified to a conversation with Dr. Knapp in
which the doctor allegedly told him that he had a "permanent injury". (T. 313). The proposed exhibit was
offered for two purposes: (1) As evidence of the
physical condition of I van Sheffy as reported by Dr.
Knap·p to the Workmen's ·Compensation Department of
Wyoming, and (2) For the purpose of impeaching the
testimony of Ivan Sheffy relative to his n1entioned conversation with Dr. Knap·p and to iinpeach the report of
Dr. Knap·p which was read in evidence. The two reports
were inconsistent. The fact that Dr. Knapp vvas not
present in eourt to personally testify does not make his
Workman's Comp·ensation report objectionable since his
report of December 7, 1958, was read with the san1e effect
as though he were present, and his testin1ony in thus
subject to impeachment.
Each document offered in
follows:

e~dence \Yas

certified .as

''I do here hv. certify. this document to be an
.
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authentic copy of like document in the official files
of this Department.
State of Wyoming
C. J. 'Doc' Rogers
State Treasurer & Fund Trustee
By Wm. P. Petry
Director of Workmen's Comp,ensation
(Seal)
Workmen's Compensation Dept.
Wyoming.
(Seal)"
The information contained in the rep·ort had direct
bearing upon the issues before the eourt and the jury;
namely, the physical condition of intervenor Ivan Sheffy
and the truthfulness of his statements relative to his conversation vvith Dr. Knapp. Certainly the documents were
material .and relevant. Under the provisions of Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the compensation records were
properly authenticated and were admissible in evidence
for the purposes indicated.
Article IV, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of he United
States requires that :
''Full faith and credit shall be given to each
state to the public .acts, records, and judieial proceedings of every other state . . . ''
Pursuant to further provisions of this section, the
United States ·Congress passed certain statutes establishing maximum standards of authentication of documents,
and if those standards are met, one state is bound to
accept in evidence the authenticated document of the
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other. (828 U.S ..C.A., Sec. 1738, 1739). The standards of
authentication so established were not intended to p.reempt this area of state relationships, and does not preclude nne state from requiring less proof of authenticity
of recol"ds or cop·ies of a sister state than is prescribed
by t'he Federal Statutes indicated. As was observed in
the case of Willock v. Wilson, (178 Mass. 68, 59 N.E. 757),
''Neither the Federal Constitution nor the
statutes forbids the state from authorizing the
proof of records in other ways than in their own
state courts; pTovided, always, of course, that the
state statutes, if put in force, shall not have the
effect of excluding a record authenticated according to the requirements of the Federal Statute.
Thus, if the authentication satisfied the local
statute, it need not be conformed to the requirements of the Act of Congress.''
See also Black v. Schafer, 62 Okla. 114, 162 P. 456 (1917).
Other eases are cited in 5 L.R.A. (New Series) 940.
T'he legislature has defined the standard of proof of
authentication of the '' orficial records'' necessary to
make the records or documents of sister states admissible
in Utah. Rule 44(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as the same is pertinent here provides:
"An official record or entry therein, when
.admissible for any purpose, 1nay be evidenced by
an official publication having the legal publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and in the absence of judicial kno\vledge of comp·etent evidence, .accon1panied with a certificate
that such officer has the custody . . . "
Further light 1R cast upon this proble1n by Rule 44
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(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as
follows:
,.
''As used in this Rule 'official record' shall
mean all public writings, including laws, judicial
records, all official documents, and public records
of private writings."
Since Rule 44(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
defines ''official record'' within the framework of Rule
44( a), it would appear to be the intention of the legislature to give definite meaning to ''official records,,, as
referred to in the rule. The statute, in defining ''official
records,'' includes not only those documents ordinarily
considered to he official but includes all "official doeuInents and p~tblic records of private wr~ti'ngs."
Under the provisions of the Wyoming law, compensation claims are filed vvith and under the supervision of the
District Court of the county where the injury occurred.
(vVyoming Statutes, Sec. 27-113). Section 27-118 of the
Wyoming Statutes is significant:
"Every a'vard vvithin the meaning of this
Act is a judicial determination of the rights of the
employer, the e1nployee, and the Industrial Accident Fund.''
The Direetor of Workmen's Compensation is a p·ublic
office created within the office of the State Treasurer
of the State of Wyoming. (Wyo. Statutes 9-82). The
recor-ds of that office are similarly public in nature. Dr.
Knapp's med~cal report which w.as prepared under direction of the Director of Workmen's Compensation, although prepared by a private physician, became a public
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document by reason of its inclusion in the files of the
Director of vVorkmen 's ·Compensation, and as such comes
within the p·urview of Rule 44 (a) and (e).
In reviewing Rule 44(a), it is to be observed that the
certification of the foreign document is to be made by
the person having ''legal custody of the record.'' The
rule states that ''. . . in the absence of judicial knowledge or eompetent evi~dence,'' the record is to be accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
A review of the certification appearing on the Workmen's
Comp·ensation Reports will indicate that each document
w.as certified to and signed by Mr. William P. Petry,
Director of Worlanen's Co1npensation. His signature
is then accompanied by the seal of the Department on
which is inscribed "Workmen's Compensation Department Seal, Wyoming.''
It is submitted that the court should have taken judicial knovvledge of the fact that the Director of Workmen's
Compens.ation has custody of the records within his department.
Under the p~rovisions of 78-25-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953), certain facts are identified of 'vhich the
courts in Utah take judicial notiee; however, facts other
than thos.e statutorily identified are also within the .ambit
of such judicial knovvledge. In this eonnection, the Supreme Court has stated in the case of Stale v. Lawrence,
120 Utah 323, 234 P. 2d 600, (1951),
''Beyond the scope of the s.tatute providing
that certain matters \Yill be taken judicial notice
of, there is another class of facts which are so
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well known and accepted that they are judicially
noticed without taking the time, trouble and expense necessary to p·rove them. Under this doctrine the court will consider, without proof of such
gener.ally known facts, its knowledge of what is
known to all persons of ordinary intellige·nce. * * *
This court has recognized that class of judicial
notice in a great variety of matters ... ''
It is submitted that the fact that the Director of
Workmen's Compensation h.a.s the legal eustody of the
records of his department is a matter so generally known
to all persons that the trial court should have taken
judicial notice of the same.
The laws of a sister state .are said to be presumed
to be the same as the laws of Utah, in the absence of proof
to the contrary. WhiJtmore Oxygen Company v. Utah
State Tax CommissiJon, 114 Utah 1, 19·6 P. 2d 976. And
even though such presumption is made in the instant ease,
the result is the same because it is a matter of statute and
common knowledge that the Director of W orkinen 's Compensation in Utah has custody of the records of his deparbnent 35-1-1- et seq., U.C.A. (1953).
Aside from the plain language contained In Rule
44 (e) U.R. C.P. relative to ''official documents,'' decided
cases have ad1nitted similar reports in evidence for similar purposes.
In the case of Hardison Seed Company v. Jones, 149
F. 2d 252, (S·ixth Cir. 1945), the 'Var Food Administrator
sought and obtained .a cease and desist order against
the defendant seed eo1npany for improperly labeling its
seeds which \vere being distributd in interstate commerce.
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A review of that order was sought claiming lack of evidence to prove imp.rop.er labeling. Evidence indicated
that samples of the seeds shipped by the defendant were
taken hy a representative of the State of Alabama and
also by a Federal representative. Analyses were made by
each of those individuals, hut they were not called as witnesses at the trial; however, a report was prepared by
each .analyst which was received in evidence. The claim
was made that such evidence was incomp·etent, being
hearsay, that its admission deprived the defendant of the
right to cross examine the seed analyst, and an enforcement ·of the order of the food administrator would deprive the defendant of due process of law. In this connection the court stated:
''Reports which are of a public nature and
taken under .a competent authority to ascertain
a matter of public interest are admissible in evidence against the whole world. It is not essential
to the admission of evidence of this nature that the
inquiry should have been made by virtue of some
judicial authority and by n1eans of ·witnesses examined upon oath. It is suffieient if it was made
by virtue of competent authority on behalf of the
public and on a subject matter of publie interest.
(Wig1nore on Evidence, Third Edition, \Tol. 5,
Sec. 1670)

* * *
''. . . The records in question "\vere of .a public character, 1nade and kept for a public purpose, and they con1e \vithin the rule \Vhich admits
in evidence records kept by persons in public office in "\Vhieh they are required, by the nature
of their offiee, to \VTite do\vn particular transactons occurring in the course of their public duties
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or under their personal supervision. (Evanston
v. Gunn, 99 U.S. 660, 666, 25 Law. Ed. 306.) The
evdence was admissible; its weight was for the
administrator.''
Similarly, in the case of Moran v. Pvttsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Company, 183 F. 2d 467 (Third Cir. 1950),
a similar result was achived. In that instance recovery
was sought from a defendant company for damages incurred through the eruption of a steel tank. A claim was
made that the defendant \Vas negligent in manufacturing
the tank in the shape of a cylinder rather than in the
shape of a sphere. ·The plaintiff offered in evidence a
report by the Bureau of 1\{ines, U.S. Department of Interior, which tended to substantiate this elaim. The report was received in evidence, even though conclusionary
in nature.
The C·ircuit Court, in finding that the report vv.as admissible without the necessity of calling the five individuals who prepared it, stated:
"The report is no less admissible because it
contains conclusions of experts vvhieh are based
upon hearsay evidence as well as upon observation. These circumstances, by virtue of expressed
statutory provision, go to the vveight rather than
to ad1nissibility. Moreover, this court has several
times held that hospital records are admissible
under the statute, and ·certainly medical diagnosis
is no less .a matter of opinion based upon observation and perhaps hearsay than this report of the
Bureau's investigation.'' (Citing cases.)
See also the case of United States v. Vvare, 247 F. 2d
698 (Seventh Cir. 1957), where an exhibit prepared by
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Federal nareotic agents and chemist was found admissible.
''We think that there can be no doubt. that the
exhibits or memoranda made by the chemist were
admissible as having been made in the regular
course of business and that it was the regular
course of business to make such memoranda or
reeord of the findings of the chemist's analyses
of the substances purchased from the defendant.''
The case was reversed on other grounds.
The Circuit Court in the case of Olender v. United
States} 210 F. 2d 795 (Ninth Cir. 1954), denied in evidence
the report of a welfare care worker, because it was hearsay. In order to come within the official documents
exception to the hearsay rule the court said that:
''. . . the facts stated in the do-cuments must
have been within the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official or his subord~natesJ and that reports based upon general
investigations and upon information gleaned
secondhand from rando1n sources must be excluded."
Of course, the Circuit Court did not have the benefit
of a statutory definition of "official documents" as is
provided by Utah Rule 44( e) U.R.C.P., dis,cussed above.
It is further submitted that a doctor 'vho makes a report
to the Director of \V. orlnnen 's Comp·ensation, as was done
in the instant case, is acting under the supervision of the
Direetor and is a subordinate for that purpose. The Director is the only· one 'vho could properly certify to the
authenticity of the dorn1nents tendered in evidenee.
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At the time the question documents "\vere offered in
evidence, they "\Vere offered not only for the purpose of
clhowing the physical condition of Mr. Sheffy, but also
for the purpose of in1pea0hing the testimony of Mr.
Sheffy and his doctor. The eourts have held that while
documents may not be admissible for one purpose, they
n1ay be for another. This principal of evidence was
clearly demonstrated in the case of Brown and Root v.
IIaddad, 180 S.W. 2d 339 (Texas, 1944). There an official report as to the cause of an .accident was admitted
in evidence for the purpose of impeaching the testimony
of the person n1aking the report. An action had been
filed by the plaintiff for 'vrongful death. At the time the
Highvvay Patrolman made his report, he stated that the
defendant's truck driver had inforn1ed him that he "\vas
blinded by bright lights and unable to see the decedent
pedestrian in tilne to avoid the collision. The report conflicted with his direct testimony at the trial where he
stated that a muddy vvindshield prevented the defendant
from observing the deeedent.
The court stated that 'vhile the patrolman's report,
as such, was a hearsay statement and should have under
the circumstances of the case been excluded at the trial,
if objected to on that ground, that sueh parts of his report as may tend to impeach any direct evidence was
admissible. To the san1e effect, see Friesen v. Schmelzel,
318 P. 2d 368 (Wyo. 1957).
In addition to the authenticated Worlnnen's Compensation Reports being admissible to show Mr. Sheffy's
ph~?sical condition, they "\vere admissible for purposes
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of impeachment, and even though it were determined by
this court that they were not admissible for the first purpose for which they were proffered, they were clearly
admissible for the second.
CONCLUSION
The records of the Department of Workmen's Compensation of the State of Wyoming were ''off}cial records'' authenticated in accordance with the intent and
meaning of Rule 44, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
trial court committed reversible error in failing to receive
them as Exhibit H 30 for the purposes offered. First,
to show the physical condition of Mr. Sheffy on the dates
of the examinations made by Dr. Knapp as revealed in
the reports; and Second, for the purpose of impeaching
the testimony of Mr. Sheffy and a subsequent medical
opinion prepared by Dr. Knapp.
The trial court erred in failing to find as a matter
of law that Mr. Sheffy'·s negligence proximately caused
his injuries.. Further, reversible error was committed in
failing to grant a ne\v trial to these appellants because of
the jury's inconsistent findings. It is respectfully submitted that this court should direct such a verdict, or in
the alternative, grant a new trial.
Resp·ectfully submitted,
HANSON, B1\LDWIN & ALLE~
& l\IERLIN R. LYBBERT

.L4ttorneys for Defendants and
Appellants
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